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Computing envy-freeable allocations
with limited subsidies
Ioannis Caragiannis∗ Stavros Ioannidis†
Abstract
Fair division has emerged as a very hot topic in AI, and envy-freeness is arguably the most
compelling fairness concept. An allocation of indivisible items to agents is envy-free if no agent
prefers the bundle of any other agent to his own in terms of value. As envy-freeness is rarely a
feasible goal, there is a recent focus on relaxations of its definition. An approach in this direction
is to complement allocations with payments (or subsidies) to the agents. A feasible goal then
is to achieve envy-freeness in terms of the total value an agent gets from the allocation and the
subsidies.
We consider the natural optimization problem of computing allocations that are envy-freeable
using the minimum amount of subsidies. As the problem is NP-hard, we focus on the design of
approximation algorithms. On the positive side, we present an algorithm which, for a constant
number of agents, approximates the minimum amount of subsidies within any required accuracy,
at the expense of a graceful increase in the running time. On the negative side, we show that,
for a superconstant number of agents, the problem of minimizing subsidies for envy-freeness is
not only hard to compute exactly (as a folklore argument shows) but also, more importantly,
hard to approximate.
1 Introduction
Fairly dividing goods among people is an extremely important quest since antiquity. Today, fair
division is a flourishing area of research in computer science, economics, and political science and
envy-freeness is considered as the ultimate fairness concept. Following a research trend that is very
popular in AI recently, we consider allocation problems with indivisible items. An allocation of
items to agents is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of items allocated to some other agent
to her own. Traditionally, agents’ preferences are based on cardinal valuations they have for the
items.
Unfortunately, with indivisible items, envy-freeness is rarely a feasible goal. For example, no
such allocation exists in the embarrasingly simple case with a single item and two agents with some
value for it. Recently proposed relaxations of envy-freeness aim to serve as useful alternative fairness
notions. In another line of research, allocations are complemented with payments (or subsidies)
to the agents. Now, envy-freeness dictates that no agent prefers the allocation and payment of
another agent to hers. Envy-freeness is a feasible goal now. However, it poses questions related to
the sparing use of money.
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In this paper, we follow an optimization approach. We define and study the optimization prob-
lem SMEF (standing for Subsidy Minimization for Envy-Freeness). Given an allocation problem
consisting of items and agents with valuations for the items, SMEF asks for an allocation that is
envy-freeable using the minimum total amount of subsidies.
SMEF is NP-hard; this follows by the NP-hardness of deciding whether a given allocation
problem has an envy-free allocation or not. Thus, we resort to approximation algorithms for
SMEF. As multiplicative approximation guarantees are hopeless, our aim is to design algorithms
that run in polynomial-time and compute an allocation that is envy-freeable with an amount of
subsidies that does not exceed the minimum possible amount of subsidies (denoted χ) by much. In
particular, we use the total valuation of all agents for all goods (denoted by sum v) as benchmark
and seek allocations that are envy-freeable with an amount of at most χ + ρ · sum v as subsidies.
The goal for the approximation guarantee ρ of an algorithm is to be as small as possible.
We initiate the study of SMEF and present two results. On the positive side, we design an
algorithm that achieves an arbitrary low approximation guarantee of ǫ > 0. When applied to
allocation instances with a constant number of agents, the algorithm uses dynamic programming
and runs in time that is polynomial in the number of items and 1/ǫ. On the negative side, we show
that, in general, SMEF is not only hard to solve exactly, but also hard to approximate within a
small constant. Unlike the folklore reduction1 for proving hardness of envy-freeness, our proof uses
a novel approximation-preserving reduction. Besides separating the general case from that with
constantly many agents, our negative result indicates that achieving good approximation guarantees
will be a challenging goal.
1.1 Related work
The concept of envy-freeness was formally introduced by Foley [1967] and Varian [1974]. As envy-
freeness may not be achievable when goods are indivisible, recent research has focused on defining
approximations of envy-freeness. These include envy-freeness up to one good [Budish, 2011], envy-
freeness up to any good [Caragiannis et al., 2019b], epistemic envy-freeness [Aziz et al., 2018], and
more. Still, achieving even them in polynomial time can be challenging and recent work has
focused on approximation algorithms; see e.g., [Lipton et al., 2004; Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018;
Barman et al., 2018; Caragiannis et al., 2019a; Chaudhury et al., 2020; Amanatidis et al., 2020].
The approach of mixing allocations with payments either from or to the agents has been ex-
tensively considered in the economics literature. A typical example is the rent division problem,
where n items (rooms) and a fixed rent have to be divided among n agents in an envy-free manner
[Su, 1999; Svensson, 1983]. Compensations to the agents were first considered by Maskin [1987].
Subsequent papers consider unit-demand allocation problems, where each agent can get at most
one item; see e.g., [Alkan et al., 1991]. Aragones [1995] and Klijn [2000] give polynomial-time algo-
rithms that compute allocations and payments. More general models are studied by Haake et al.
[2002] and Meertens et al. [2002].
In the AI literature, Chevaleyre et al. [2017] consider allocation problems and monetary trans-
fers between the agents. In a model that is the closest to ours, Halpern and Shah [2019] aim to
bound the amount of external subsidies assuming that all agent valuations for goods are in [0, 1].
Among several results, they conjectured that subsidies of n− 1 suffice; an even stronger version of
1Notice that deciding whether an envy-free allocation exists for two agents with identical item valuations requires
solving Partition, a well-known NP-hard problem [Garey and Johnson, 1979].
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the conjecture was proved very recently by Brustle et al. [2019].
2 Preliminaries
We consider allocation instances with a set M of m items and a set N of n agents. Each agent
i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : M → R≥0 over the items.
2 With some abuse of notation, we
use vi(B) to denote the valuation of agent i for the set (or bundle) of items B. Valuations are
additive, i.e., vi(B) =
∑
g∈B vi(g). An allocation is simply a partition X = (X1,X2, ...,Xn) of the
items of M into n disjoint bundles, where agent i ∈ N is supposed to get the bundle Xi. We use
the abbreviations sum v =
∑
i∈N vi(M) and max v = maxi∈N vi(M).
We define the social welfare of an allocation X = (X1, ...,Xn) to be SW(X, v) =
∑
i∈N vi(Xi).
An allocation X = (X1,X2, ...,Xn) is envy-free if vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xj) for every pair of agents i and
j. Informally, envy-freeness requires that no agent envies the bundle allocated to any other agent
compared to her own.
For an allocation X = (X1, ...,Xn) in an instance with agent valuations v, the envy graph
EG(X, v) is an edge-weighted complete directed graph that has a node for each agent and the
weight of the directed edge (i, j) represents the “envy” of agent i for agent j. Using G = EG(X, v)
and wgtG(i, j) for the weight of the directed edge from node i to node j in the envy graph EG(X, v),
we define wgtG(i, j) = vi(Xj)− vi(Xi).
We also consider payments (or subsidies) to the agents, represented by a payment vector π =
〈π1, ..., πn〉 with non-negative entries, i.e., πi ≥ 0 for every agent i ∈ N . Below, we use the terms
“payment” and “subsidy” interchangeably. Now, we say that the pair (X,π) of the allocation X
and payment vector π is envy-free if vi(Xi) + πi ≥ vi(Xj) + πj for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N .
Informally, this extended version of envy-freeness requires that no agent envies the bundle and the
payment of any other agent compared to the bundle and payment she gets.
We say that an allocation X is envy-freeable if there is a payment vector π so that the pair
(X,π) is envy-free. Even though the use of payments makes the goal of envy-freeness feasible, not
all allocations are envy-freeable. The following theorem, due to Halpern and Shah [2019], gives
sufficient and necessary conditions so that an allocation is envy-freeable.
Theorem 1 (Halpern and Shah [2019]). The following statements are equivalent:
• The allocation X = (X1,X2, ...,Xn) is envy-freeable.
• The allocation X maximizes social welfare among all redistributions of its bundles to the
agents.
• The envy graph EG(X, v) contains no directed cycles of positive total weight.
Detecting whether a given allocation X is envy-freeable can be done using the following linear
program LP(X, v):
minimize
∑
i∈N
πi (1)
subject to: πi − πj ≥ vi(Xj)− vi(Xi),∀i, j ∈ N
2In our exposition, we assume that valuations are non-negative, even though our positive result can be extended
to work without this assumption, in the model of Aziz et al. [2019] where items can be goods or chores.
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π ≥ 0
LP(X, v) aims to find a payment vector π so that the envy-freeness constraints between pairs
of agents are satisfied. In addition, it minimizes the total amount of payments. As it is observed
by Halpern and Shah [2019], the payment πi of agent i obtained in this way is equal to the maximum
total weight in any simple path that originates from node i in the envy graph EG(X, v).
We study the optimization problem SMEF (standing for Subsidy Minimization for Envy-
Freeness). Given an allocation instance, SMEF aims to compute an allocation that is envy-freeable
with the minimum amount of subsidies. Since the problem of computing an envy-free allocation is
NP-hard, SMEF is NP-hard as well.
We are interested in the design of approximation algorithms for SMEF. As algorithms with finite
multiplicative approximation ratio are hopeless (since it is hard to decide whether the minimum
amount of subsidies is zero or not), we seek polynomial-time algorithms that compute an allocation
that is envy-freeable with subsidies χ+ ρ · sum v, with the approximation guarantee ρ being as low
as possible.
As a warmup, consider the algorithm that allocates all items to the agent i∗ that has maximum
value for M and paying a subsidy of vi∗(M) to every other agent i. This algorithm is clearly
polynomial-time. The allocation obtained is envy-freeable since no redistribution of the items (i.e.,
giving all items to another agent) results to a higher social welfare. And the particular payments
are right: agent i∗ is indifferent between the bundle M and the payment to any other agent, while
the other agents are indifferent between the (equal) payments, and prefers their payment to getting
the whole bundle M . It can be easily verfied that the algorithm guarantees an amount of at most
χ+ (n − 1)max v ≤ χ+ (n − 1) sum v as subsidies; this is the best guarantee of this form for this
algorithm in the worst-case.
3 An approximation algorithm
We now present an algorithm that does much better. The algorithm exploits ideas that have led to
poylynomial-time approximation schemes for combinatorial optimization problems like Knapsack;
e.g., see Vazirani [2001]. It first discretize all valuations to multiples of a discretization parameter.
In this way, the different discretized valuations an agent can have for bundles of items in the new
instance is small. This allows to classify all allocations into a relatively small number of classes,
each defined by specific discretized valuation levels of each agent for all bundles. Dynamic pro-
gramming is used to decide the classes that are non-empty and to select a representative allocation
from each class. The final allocation is selected among all representative allocations, possibly after
redistributing the bundles so that social welfare (with respect to the original valuations) is maxi-
mized (in order to get envy-freeability). This requires a call to linear program (1) to compute the
minimum amount of subsidies for each representative allocation.
The classification of allocations guarantees that the algorithm will consider a representative
allocation from the class that also contains the optimal one (i.e., the allocation that is envy-
freeable with the minimum amount of subsidies overall). Our analysis shows that the amount of
subsidies for making the representative allocation envy-free is close to optimal. Polynomial running
time for the case of a constant number of agents follows by setting the discretization parameter
appropriately.
We now present our algorithm in detail. It uses an accuracy parameter ǫ > 0 and initially
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decides the value of the discretization parameter δ as follows:
δ =
ǫmax v
4mn2
.
First, the algorithm implicitly discretizes all agent valuations by defining new valuations v˜ as
follows: for an agent i with valuation vi(g) for item g, the discretized valuation v˜i(g) is equal to
⌊vi(g)/δ⌋ δ.
The algorithm uses an arbitrary ordering of the items in M ; let M = {g1, g2, ..., gm}, where the
item indices are those in this ordering. The algorithm builds a table T which classifies all possible
allocations of subsets of M . Consider an (n2+1)-dimensional tuple τ = (t, Pij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n), where
t is an integer from 1 to m and Pij is an integer from 0 to ⌊max v/δ⌋, for every pair of agents i and
j. The entry T(τ) of the table indicates whether an allocation At = (At1, A
t
2, ..., A
t
n) of the first t
items g1, ..., gt of M to the n agents, satisfying v˜i(A
t
j) = Pijδ for every pair of agents i and j, exists
(T(τ) = 1) or not (T(τ) = 0).
The entries of T are computed using the following recursive relation:
• For a tuple τ = (t, Pij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n) with t = 1, the algorithm sets T(τ) = 1 if there exists
k ∈ [n] such that, for every i ∈ [n], v˜i(g1) = Pikδ and Pij = 0 for every j 6= k. Otherwise, the
algorithm sets T(τ) = 0.
• For a tuple τ = (t, Pij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n) with t > 1, the algorithm sets T(τ) = 1 if there exists
k ∈ [n] and tuple τ ′ = (t−1, P ′ij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n) such that, for every i ∈ [n], Pik = P
′
ik+ v˜i(gt)/δ
and Pij = P
′
ij for every j 6= k. Otherwise, the algorithm sets T(τ) = 0.
Essentially, each non-zero entry of T (e.g., T(τ) = 1) indicates a non-empty class Aτ of (possi-
bly partial, when the first argument of τ is an integer smaller than m) allocations. To compute a
representative complete allocation Aτ ∈ Aτ among those implied by the non-zero entry correspond-
ing to the tuple (m,Pmij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n), the algorithm does the following for t = m downto 2. Let
k ∈ [n] be such that T(τ ′) = 1 for a tuple τ ′ = (t− 1, P t−1ij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n) with P
t−1
ik = P
t
ik− v˜i(gt)/δ
and P t−1ij = P
t
ij for every pair of agents i and j 6= k. The algorithm assigns item gt to agent k and
proceeds to considering the next item. The first item g1 is assigned to agent k such that T(τ
′) = 1
for a tuple τ ′ = (1, P 1ij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n) with P
1
ik = v˜i(g1)/δ and P
1
ij = 0 for every pair of agents i and
j 6= k.
Next, the algorithm redistributes the bundles of each allocation Aτ that represents a non-
empty class Aτ so that an allocation A
′
τ of maximum social welfare (among those that distribute
the particular bundles to the agents) is obtained (in terms of the original valuations). It solves
LP(A′τ , v) (for the original valuations) to compute the minimum amount of subsidies that makes
A′τ envy-free. Among all allocations A
′
τ , it outputs the one with minimum amount of subsidies.
The approximation guarantee of the algorithm is given by the next lemma.
Lemma 2. Given an instance of SMEF that has an allocation that is envy-freeable with an amount
of χ as total subsidies, the algorithm computes an allocation that is envy-freeable with total subsidies
of at most χ+ 4mn2δ.
Proof. Let τ be a full tuple such that Aτ contains an allocation O = (O1, ..., On) that is envy-
freeable with subsidies of χ. Since Aτ is non-empty, it is T(τ) = 1 and let A be the allocation
computed by the algorithm as representative of Aτ . Also, let A
′ be the allocation that is obtained
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after redistributing the bundles of A. By Theorem 1, A′ is clearly envy-freeable; we will show that
the corresponding subsidies are at most χ + 4mn2δ. Clearly, the output of the algorithm will be
envy-freeable with at most this amount of subsidies.
Let σ ∈ L(n) be the permutation over [n] such that A′j = Aσ(j) for every j ∈ [n]. Let G and H
be the envy graphs EG(O, v) and EG(A′, v), respectively.
We now present the most crucial component of our analysis. It exploits the fact that both O
and A belong to class Aτ and uses the third statement of Theorem 1.
Lemma 3. For every pair of agents i and j, there exists a (not necessarily simple) path p(i, j)
from node σ(i) to node σ(j) such that
wgtH(i, j) ≤
∑
e∈p(i,j)
wgtG(e) + 4mδ
Proof. In the proof, we will use the following simple claim.
Claim 4. For every agent i and every two bundles B1 and B2 such that v˜i(B1) = v˜i(B2), it holds
that
−|B2|δ ≤ vi(B1)− vi(B2) ≤ |B1|δ. (2)
Proof. First observe that, by the definition of v˜ and its relation to v, for every agent i and item
g ∈M , it holds that v˜i(g) ≤ vi(g) ≤ v˜i(g) + δ. Hence, for every bundle B, we have
v˜i(B) ≤ vi(B) ≤ v˜i(B) + |B|δ.
The claim follows by applying this inequality for bundles B1 and B2 and using the fact that
v˜i(B1) = v˜i(B2).
We use the notation σ−1 to refer to the inverse permutation of σ, i.e., σ−1(k) = j when k = σ(j).
Consider the set C that contains edge (k, σ−1(k)) for every agent k such that k 6= σ−1(k). C is
either empty (if k = σ−1(k) for every agent k) or consists of disjoint directed cycles. For an agent
i, if σ−1(i) 6= i, we denote by Ci the set of nodes that are spanned by the cycle of C that includes
node i. Otherwise, we define Ci to contain only node i.
Define the (not necessarily simple) path p(i, j) from node σ(i) to node σ(j) to contain edge
(k, σ(k)) for every node k in the set Ci besides node i and, if i 6= σ(j), the directed edge (i, σ(j)).
For every pair of agents i and j, we have that the weight of the directed edge (i, j) in H is
wgtH(i, j) ≤ wgtH(i, j) −
∑
k∈Ci
wgtH(k, σ
−1(k))
= vi(A
′
j)− vi(A
′
i)−
∑
k∈Ci
(
vk(A
′
σ−1(k))− vk(A
′
k)
)
= vi(Aσ(j))− vi(Aσ(i))−
∑
k∈Ci
(
vk(Ak)− vk(Aσ(k))
)
≤ vi(Oσ(j))− vi(Oσ(i))−
∑
k∈Ci
(
vk(Ok)− vk(Oσ(k))
)
+

|Aσ(j)|+ |Oσ(i)|+
∑
k∈Ci
|Ok|+
∑
k∈Ci
|Aσ(k)|

 δ
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≤ vi(Oσ(j))− vi(Oσ(i))−
∑
k∈Ci
(
vk(Ok)− vk(Oσ(k))
)
+ 4mδ
= vi(Oσ(j))− vi(Oi) +
∑
k∈Ci\{i}
(
vk(Oσ(k))− vk(Ok)
)
+ 4mδ
= wgtG(i, σ(j)) +
∑
k∈Ci\{i}
wgtG(k, σ(k)) + 4mδ
=
∑
e∈p(i,j)
wgtG(e) + 4mδ.
The first inequality follows since Ci consist of node i only (when i = σ(i)) or the edges (k, σ
−1(k))
for k ∈ Ci form a directed cycle of non-positive total weight in H. The second inequality follows
by applying Claim 4 (recall that both allocations A and O belong to the class Aτ and, hence,
v˜ℓ(Aq) = v˜ℓ(Oq) for every pair of agents ℓ and q). The third inequality follows since the bundles
Aσ(k) (respectively, Ok) for k ∈ Ci are disjoint. The equalities are obvious or follow by the definition
of the weights.
Now, let π′ and π be the solutions of LP(A′, v) and LP(O, v), respectively. Hence, χ =
Sub(O, v) =
∑n
i=1 πi. We will use Lemma 3 to argue that
π′i ≤ πσ(i) + 4mnδ. (3)
This will yield
Sub(A′, v) =
n∑
i=1
π′i ≤
n∑
i=1
(
πσ(i) + 4mnδ
)
= χ+ 4mn2δ,
completing the proof.
Recall from Theorem 1 that the payment π′ℓ (respectively, πℓ) is equal to the maximum path
weight over all simple paths that originate from node ℓ in graph H (respectively, graph G). Let
Qℓ be the corresponding simple path that is destined for some node s (and originates from node
ℓ), i.e., π′ℓ =
∑
e∈Qℓ
wgtH(e). We construct the (not necessarily simple) path Pℓ from node σ(ℓ)
to node σ(s) of G that consists of path p(i, j) for every directed edge (i, j) in the path Qℓ. Using
Lemma 3, we get
π′ℓ =
∑
e∈Qℓ
wgtH(e) ≤
∑
e∈Qℓ

 ∑
e′∈p(e)
wgtG(e
′) + 4mδ


≤
∑
e∈Qℓ
∑
e′∈p(e)
wgtG(e
′) + 4mnδ =
∑
e∈Pℓ
wgtG(e) + 4mnδ. (4)
The second inequality follows since path Qℓ is simple (and, hence, contains at most n − 1 edges).
Now, create the simple path P ′ℓ from node σ(ℓ) to node σ(s) by removing the cycles in Pℓ. Since
graph G does not have any directed cycles of positive total weight (by Theorem 1), we have
wgtg(Pℓ) ≤ wgtG(P
′
ℓ). Now, (4) yields
π′ℓ ≤
∑
e∈P ′
ℓ
wgtG(e) + 4mnδ,
which implies (3) since P ′ℓ is a simple path that originates from node σ(i).
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The running time of the algorithm depends on the number of table entries, the number of steps
required for computing each table entry using the recursive relation, the number of steps required
to compute a representative allocation for a non-empty allocation class, the redistribution time,
and the time required to solve the linear programs.
The dimensions of the table T are m for the first one that enumerates over all items, and at
most 1 + ⌊max v/δ⌋ = 1 + 4mn
2
ǫ
for each of the other dimensions. Overall, the size of the table is
O
((
m
ǫ
)n2+1)
. The computation of each table entry using the recursive relation needs the values
in n2 table entries that have previously computed. In a representative allocation, the agent in
which each of the m items is allocated requires time n2 as well, i.e., time O(m) in total. The
redistribution of the bundles can be implemented using a matching computation in a complete
edge-weighted bipartite graph that has a node for each agent and for each bundle and the weight
of an edge indicates the valuation of an agent for a bundle. As n is constant, this takes constant
time. Also, the linear programs have constant size. In general, since n is a constant, it is ignored
in the O notation unless it appears in the exponent.
The above discussion is summarized in the next statement.
Theorem 5. Let ǫ > 0 be the accuracy parameter used by the algorithm. Given an instance of
SMEF consisting of a constant number n of agents with valuations v over a set M of m items
that has an envy-freeable allocation using an amount χ of subsidies, the algorithm runs in time
O
(
(m/ǫ)n
2+2
)
and computes an allocation that is envy-freeable using a total subsidy of at most
χ+ ǫmax v.
4 Hardness of approximating SMEF
In this section, we show that approximation guarantees like the one in the statement of Theorem 5
are not possible when the number of agents is part of the input. In particular, we show the following
negative result.
Theorem 6. Approximating SMEF within an additive term of 3 · 10−4 sum v is NP-hard.
We prove the theorem by presenting a reduction from Maximum 3-Dimensional Matching
(MAX-3DM). An instance of MAX-3DM consists of three disjoint sets of elements A = {a1, a2, ..., an},
B = {b1, b2, ..., bn}, and C = {c1, c2, ..., cn}, each of size n, and a set T of m triplets of the form
(ai, bj , ck) with ai ∈ A, bj ∈ B, and ck ∈ C. The objective is to compute a disjoint subset of T (or,
simply, a 3D matching) of maximum size. The problem is well-known to be NP-hard not only to
solve exactly [Garey and Johnson, 1979] but also to approximate [Kann, 1991].
We will use the inapproximability result of Chleb´ık and Chleb´ıkova´ [2006], which applies to
bounded instances of MAX-3DM in which each element appears in exactly two triplets (i.e., m =
2n); we will refer to this restriction of MAX-3DM as MAX-3DM-2. In particular, Chleb´ık and Chleb´ıkova´
[2006] show that it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances of MAX-3DM-2 with a 3D match-
ing of size at least K and instances of MAX-3DM-2 in which any 3D matching has size at most
K − 0.01n.3
3This statement is actually weaker than the one proved by Chleb´ık and Chleb´ıkova´ [2006]. However, it suffices
for our purpose to prove hardness of approximation. Note that we have made no particular attempt to optimize our
inapproximabity threshold.
8
4.1 The reduction
We present our reduction and full proof for the case χ > 0. At the end of the section, we discuss the
minor modifications required for the case χ = 0. On input an instance of MAX-3DM-2, our reduc-
tion constructs in polynomial time an instance of SMEF, in which the minimum amount of susbsidies
that can make some allocation envy-free is exactly χ(1 + max{K − L}), where L is the size of the
maximum 3D matching in the MAX-3DM-2 instance. Using the result of Chleb´ık and Chleb´ıkova´
[2006], we will get that it is NP-hard to distinguish between SMEF instances in which the minimum
amount of subsidies is at most χ and instances in which it is at least χ(1 + 0.01n). Hence, SMEF
will be proved to be NP-hard to approximate within 0.01nχ. Our construction will be such that
sum v < 30nχ. In this way, we will obtain a hardness of approximating SMEF within an additive
term of (at least) 3 · 10−4 sum v, as desired.
Our reduction is as follows. Given an instance of MAX-3DM-2 consisting of sets of elements A,
B, and C, each of size n, and a set of 2n triplets T , the instance of SMEF has
• three agents 1, 2, and 3,
• three agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) for every triplet t ∈ T ,
• an item Ai for every element ai ∈ A,
• an item Bi for every element bi ∈ B,
• an item Γi for every element ci ∈ C,
• three items ∆t, Zt, and Θt for every triplet t ∈ T , and
• an additional item Λ.
The agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) that correspond to the triplet t = (ai, bj , cj) have valuations
0 for all items besides the items Ai, Bj, Γk, ∆t, Zt, and Θt. Agents 1, 2 have valuation 0 for all
items besides item Λ and agent 3 has valuation zero for all items besides item Λ and items Θt for
t ∈ T . Their remaining valuations are as follows:
Ai Bj Γk ∆t Zt Θt Λ
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 χ
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 χK
3 0 0 0 0 0 χ χK
J1(t) χ χ χ 3χ 3χ 0 0
J2(t) 0 0 0 χ χ χ 0
J3(t) 0 0 0 0 χ 0 0
Recall that each element belongs to exactly two triplets. Hence, two agents have positive value for
item Ai (similarly for items Bj and Γk): agents J2(t1) and J2(t2) such that the triplets t1 and t2
contains element ai (similarly for elements bj and ck). It is easy to see that either two or three
agents have positive value for each item. For every triplet t, the agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t)
have total valuation 9χ, 3χ, and χ, respectively. Taking into account that K ≤ n, we obtain that
sum v < 30nχ.
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4.2 Lower bound on subsidies
Consider an instance of SMEF constructed by our reduction and letX be an envy-freeable allocation
in it. We will first lower-bound the minimum total subsidies that make X envy-free. First observe
that X cannot give item Λ to agent 1; in that case, exchanging the bundles of agents 1 and 2 would
result to an increase of the social welfare and, hence, X would not be envy-freeable. If X gives
item Λ to agent 3, agents 1 and 2 would need subsidies of at least χ and χK, respectively, so that
they do not envy agent 3. Hence, Sub(A, v) ≥ χ(1 +K) in this case.
In the following, we will lower-bound the minimum total subsidies that make X envy-free
assuming that item Λ is given to agent 2. Let θ be the number of items Θt for t ∈ [2n] agent 3
gets. Then, agent 3 should be given a subsidy of at least χmax{K−θ, 0} so that she does not envy
agent 2. Agent 1 needs a subsidy of χmax{K − θ, 1} so that she does not envy agents 1 and 2.
For a triplet t = (ai, bj , ck) in the original instance of MAX-3DM-2, we call it full if all items
Ai, Bj, and Γk (which correspond to the elements of the triplet) have been allocated to the agents
J1(t), J2(t), or J3(t). Otherwise, we call it partial. We call t supported if item Θt has been allocated
to agent J2(t); otherwise, we call t unsupported.
In the next four claims, we lower-bound the total amount of subsidies the agents J1(t), J2(t),
and J3(t) of a triplet t need, depending of the type of t.
Claim 7. The agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) of a full and supported triplet t need subsidies of at
least χmax{K − θ − 2, 0}.
Proof. Consider a full and supported triplet t. If agent J2(t) has value at most 2χ (i.e., getting Θt
and at most one of the items ∆t and Zt), then she needs a subsidy of at least χmax{K − θ− 2, 0}
so that she does not envy agent 3. If agent J2(t) has value 3χ by getting both items ∆t and Zt in
addition to Θt, she needs a subsidy of at least χmax{K − θ − 3, 0}, while then agents J1(t) and
J3(t) need subsidies of at least 3χ+χmax{K− θ− 3, 0} and χ+χmax{K− θ− 3, 0}, respectively,
so that they do not envy agent J2(t). In both cases, the total amount of subsidies of the agents
J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) is at least χmax{K − θ − 2, 0}.
Claim 8. The agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) of a full and unsupported triplet need subsidies of at
least χmax{K − θ − 1, 0}.
Proof. Consider a full and unsupported triplet t. If agent J2(t) has value at most χ (i.e., getting
at most one of the items ∆t and Zt), then she needs a subsidy of at least χmax{K − θ − 1, 0} so
that she does not envy agent 3. If agent J2(t) has value 2χ by getting both items ∆t and Zt, she
needs a subsidy of at least χmax{K − θ − 2, 0}, while then agents J1(t) and J3(t) need subsidies
of at least 3χ+χmax{K − θ− 2, 0} and χ+χmax{K − θ− 2, 0}, respectively, so that they do not
envy agent J2(t). In both cases, the total amount of subsidies of agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) is
at least χmax{K − θ − 1, 0}.
Claim 9. The agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) of a partial and supported triplet t need subsidies of
at least χmax{K − θ − 1, 0}.
Proof. Let t be a partial and supported triplet. If agent J2(t) does not get items ∆t and Zt, then
she gets only a value of χ from item Θt and needs a subsidy of at least χmax{K − θ− 1, 0} so that
she does not envy agent 3.
If agent J2(t) gets item ∆t but not item Zt, she needs a subsidy of χmax{K − θ− 2, 0} so that
she does not envy agent 3. Then, if agent J1(t) does not get item Zt, her value is at most 2χ (from
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at most two of the items Ai, Bj , and Γk) and needs a subsidy of χ+ χmax{K − θ − 2, 0} so that
she does not envy agent J2(t). If agent J3(t) does not get item Zt, she needs a subsidy of at least
χ+ χmax{K − θ − 2, 0} so that she does not envy agent J2(t).
If agent J2(t) gets item Zt but not ∆t, she needs a subsidy of χmax{K − θ − 2, 0} so that she
does not envy agent 3 and agent J3(t) needs a subsidy of at least χ+ χmax{K − θ − 2, 0} so that
she does not envy agent J2(t).
Finally, if agent J2(t) gets items ∆t and Zt, her value is 3χ and needs a subsidy of at least
χmax{K − θ − 3, 0} so that she does not envy agent 3. Then, each of agents J1(t) and J3(t) need
a subsidy of at least χ+ χmax{K − θ − 3, 0} so that they do not envy agent J2(t).
So, the total amount of subsidies the agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) need in each case are at least
χmax{K − θ − 1, 0}.
Claim 10. The agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) of a partial and unsupported triplet t need subsidies
of at least χmax{K − θ, 1}.
Proof. Let t be a partial and unsupported triplet. If agent J2(t) gets both items ∆t and Zt, she
needs a subsidy of χmax{K − θ − 2, 0} so that she does not envy agent 3, while agents J1(t) and
J3(t) would then need subsidies of at least 4χ+χmax{K − θ− 2, 0} and χ+ χmax{K − θ− 2, 0},
respectively, so that they do not envy agent J2(t).
If agent J2(t) gets only item ∆t, she needs a subsidy of χmax{K − θ − 1, 0} so that she does
not envy agent 3. Then, the agent who does not get item Zt among J1(t) and J3(t) would need a
subsidy of at least χ+ χmax{K − θ − 1, 0} so that she does not envy agent J2(t).
If agent J2(t) gets only item Zt, she needs a subsidy of χmax{K − θ − 1, 0} so that she does
not envy agent 3, while agent J3(t) needs a subsidy of at least χ+χmax{K − θ− 1, 0} so that she
does not envy agent J2(t).
Finally, if agent J2(t) gets no item (among ∆t and Zt), she needs a subsidy of at least χ so that
she does not envy the agents who get items ∆t and Zt and a subsidy of at least χmax{K − θ, 0}
so that she does not envy agent 3.
So, the total amount of subsidies the agents J1(t), J2(t), and J3(t) need in each case are at least
χmax{K − θ, 1}.
We now denote by L1, L2, P1, and P2, the number of full and supported, full and unsupported,
partial and supported, and partial and unsupported triplets defined by X, respectively. Notice
that the full triplets form a 3D matching. Denoting by L the maximum size over all 3D matchings
of the MAX-3DM-2 instance, we have L ≥ L1 + L2. Using Claims 7-10, and our observations for
agents 1 and 3, we have that the total amount of subsidies X needs to become envy-free is
Sub(X, v) ≥ χ (L1max{K − θ − 2, 0} + L2max{K − θ − 1, 0}
+P1max{K − θ − 1, 0} + P2max{K − θ, 1}
+max{K − θ, 0}+max{K − θ, 1}) . (5)
We will distinguish between two cases for K − θ. If K − θ ≥ 2, (5) yields
Sub(X, v) ≥ χ (L2 + P1 + 2P2 + 4) = χ (2n− L1 + P2 + 4) ≥ χ(1 + max{K − L, 0}).
Now, notice that θ, the number of items Θt agent 3 gets in X is upper-bounded by the number of
unsupported triplets, i.e., θ ≤ L2 + P2. Thus, if K − θ ≤ 1, (5) yields
Sub(X, v) ≥ χ (P2 +K − θ + 1) ≥ χ (K − L2 + 1) ≥ χ(1 + max{K − L, 0}).
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We conclude that the minimum amount of subsidies necessary to make X envy-free is at least
χ(1 + max{K − L, 0}).
4.3 Upper bound on minimum subsidies
We now present our upper bound on the minimum amount of subsidies for envy-freeness. Given a
3D matching M of maximum size L in the MAX-3DM-2 instance, we will construct an allocation
for the SMEF instance and will show that it is envy-freeable with an amount of subsidies equal to
χ(1 + max{K − L, 0}).
For defining the allocation, we partition T \M in two disjoint sets of triplets T1 and T2 of size
2n−max{K,L} and max{K − L, 0}, respectively.
• For every triplet t = (ai, bj , ck) ∈ M, agent J1(t) gets items Ai, Bj, and Ck, agent J2(t) gets
item ∆t and agent J3(t) gets item Zt.
• For every triplet t = (ai, bj , ck) 6∈ M, let F (t) be the set of items that correspond to the
elements of t that have not been included in triplets of M. Note that, due to the maximality
of M, F (t) has zero, one, or two elements among Ai, Bj, and Γk. For every triplet t =
(ai, bj , ck) ∈ T1, agent J1(t) gets item ∆t, agent J2(t) gets the items in F (t), if any, and item
Θt, and agent J3(t) gets item Zt.
• For every triplet t = (ai, bj , ck) ∈ T2, agent J1(t) gets item ∆t, agent J2(t) gets the items in
F (t), if any, and agent J3(t) gets item Zt.
• Agent 3 gets item Θt for every triplet t ∈ M∪ T2.
• Agent 2 gets item Λ.
• Agent 1 gets no items.
We claim that the allocation above is envy-freeable by assigning a subsidy of χ to agent 1 and a
subsidy of χ to agent J2(t) for every triplet t ∈ T2 (if any).
Indeed, agent 1 has positive value only for item Λ, which is given to agent 2, who gets no
subsidy. Also, no other agent gets a subsidy more than the subsidy χ that is given to agent 1.
Hence, agent 1 is not envious. Agent 2 gets item Λ, which is the only item she values positively
and much higher than the subsidy given to any other agent. Hence, agent 2 is not envious either.
Agent 3 gets exactly max{K,L} items of total value of χmax{K,L}. She does not envy agent 2
who gets item Λ (which agent 3 values for χK) since no subsidy is given to agent 2. Clearly, the
value of agent 3 is much higher than the subsidy given to any other agent.
Consider a triplet t = (ai, bj , ck) ∈ M. Agent J1(t) has a value of 3χ for the items Ai, Bj ,
and Γk she gets. The remaining items for which she has positive valuation of 3χ have been given
to agents J2(t) and J3(t), respectively. Since these agents do not get subsidies, agent J1(t) is not
envious of them. Clearly, agent J1(t) is not envious of any other agent since she has zero value for
all other items and no agent gets a subsidy more than χ. Agent J3(t) gets item Zt, the only item
for which she has positive value and does not envy any other agent since no one gets a subsidy
higher than χ. Agent J2(t) gets a value of χ from item ∆t and does not envy agent J3(t) who gets
item Zt or agent 3 who gets item Θt as these agents receive no subsidy. Clearly, agent J2(t) envies
no other agent.
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Now consider a triplet t = (ai, bj , ck) 6∈ M. Agent J1(t) has a value of 3χ for the item ∆t she
gets. The remaining items for which she has positive valuation have been allocated as follows. Item
Zt has been given to agent J3(t); clearly, agent J1(t) is not envious of J3(t) since the latter gets no
subsidies. The items in F (t) have been given to agent J2(t). Again, agent J1(t) is not envious of
J2(t) since F (t) contains at most two items (which agent J1(t) values for χ each) and agent J2(t)
gets a subsidy of zero (if t ∈ T1) or χ (if i ∈ T2). Clearly, J1(t) does not envy any other agent.
Agent J3(t) gets item Zt, the only item for which she has positive value and does not envy any
other agent since no one gets a subsidy higher than χ. Agent J2(t) gets a value of χ either from
item Θt (if t ∈ T1) or as subsidy (if t ∈ T2) and does not envy agent J1(t) who gets item ∆t or
agent 3 who gets item Θt only when t ∈ T2; recall that these two agents never get subsidies. Again,
agent J2(t) envies no other agent.
4.4 Adapting the proof for the case χ = 0
The modification required in our reduction so that it covers the case χ = 0 as well is to remove
agent 1 and replace χ with 1 in the definition of valuations. The same reasoning as above gives
a minimum amount of subsidies for the SMEF instance of exactly max{K − L, 0}, where L is
the maximum 3D matching size in the MAX-3DM-2 instance. In this way, we get that SMEF is
NP-hard to approximate within 0.01n and the construction satisfies sum v < 30n. This yields the
desired inapproximability result in the statement of Theorem 6 for the case χ = 0 as well.
5 Epilogue
We have initiated the study of the optimization problem SMEF. The apparent open problem that
deserves investigation is to close the gap between the trivial approximation guarantee of n − 1 in
Section 2 and our negative result for super-constant numbers of agents. Interestingly, an advantage
the trivial algorithm has is that the particular payments incentivize the agents to report their
valuations truthfully. What is the possible approximation guarrantee that can be obtained for
SMEF by truthful algorithms? Unfortunately, a simple application of Myerson’s characterization
in single-item settings [Myerson, 1981] indicates that no approximation guarantee better than n−1
is possible.
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